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Rule 4: Service by Mail May Cost You
More Than a Stamp
Three years have passed since Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure authorized service of process by first-class mail,' allowing ample time
to test this method's performance. The adoption of a general mail pro-
vision was designed to reduce the burden on the U.S. marshals, then the
primary process servers, and to save costs to parties by encouraging service
by mail.2 The first-class mail provision, which seemed to be a clear, simple,
and economical procedure, in practice has become confusing, complicated,
and expensive. This outcome is due both to Congress' choice of first-class
mail, and to the poorly drafted rule that Congress created to implement
service by mail.3 Rule 4 affects all litigants because service of process, the
means of notifying a defendant that he has been sued, is a basic step in
initiating every civil action. 4 Proper service is required to maintain every
1. Rule 4(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was amended effective February 26,
1983 to authorize service of process by first-class mail. Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) states:
(C) A summons and complaint may be served upon a defendant [by reference
to paragraphs (I) and (3) of subdivision (d) the rule restricts the use of the first-
class mail provision to competent adults and business organizations] -
(ii) by mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint (by first-class mail,
postage prepaid) to the person to be served, together with two copies of a notice
and acknowledgment conforming substantially to form 18-A and a return envelope,
postage prepaid, addressed to the sender. If no acknowledgment of service under
this subdivision of this rule is received by the sender within 20 days after the date
of mailing, service of such summons and complaint shall be made under sub-
paragraph (A) [service by person 18 years or older] or (B) [service by federal
marshal or person specially appointed by court] of this paragraph in the manner
prescribed by subdivision (d)(1) [personal service or by leaving copies at the
defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode] or (d)(3) [delivering to an
officer, managing or general agent, or other notarized agent of a business or-
ganization and, if required by statute, also mailing a copy to the defendant].
FED. R. Crv. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii).
2. AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RuLEs OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 93 F.R.D. 255, 259-60 (1982)
(Appendix A) [hereinafter cited as SuPREME COURT AMENDMErns]. Appendix A explains: "The
proposed amendments to Rule 4 are occasioned by the reduction in appropriations available
to the Marshal's Service and pending legislation to relieve marshals of the duty to serve the
summons and complaint in private civil litigation. Appropriations have already been reduced
and it appears that the proposed legislation will soon be enacted into law. For these reasons
it is important that Rule 4 be amended promptly." Id.
3. See, e.g., Gaines, Rule 4: A Nightmare in Several Acts, LITIATION, Winter 1985, at 8;
Siegel, The Recent Amendments to Rule 4 Pose Problems for Practitioners, Nat'l L.J., Aug.
1, 1983, at 48, col. I; Vairo, Amended Rule 4 of Civil Procedure and Its Effects on Process
Serving, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 17, 1984, at 32, col. 1.
4. 2 J. MOORE, J. LucAs, H. FINK & C. THOMPSON, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 4.02[l]
(2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter cited as MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE].
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action.' Litigants need a clear rule that can be followed with confidence,
which is exactly what they now lack.
This Note proposes that the rule must again be rewritten. The Note will
survey the historical background of the 1983 amendments, describe how the
first-class mail provision operates, detail the major problems and potential
difficulties with that provision, and suggest measures which might be taken
to make the rule more effective. The Note concludes that the potential
effectiveness of any piecemeal measure is undermined by the inherent flaws
in using first-class mail for service of process. The first-class mail method
must be discarded and replaced with a more efficient and effective low-cost
method with unambiguous, easy-to-follow procedures. The Note proposes a
hybrid model, one that adopts the Supreme Court's recommendation of
certified mail use, with certain variations designed to optimize that mode of
service.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Prior to February 1983, Rule 4 had no general provision for service by
mail. 6 The usual procedure was for a plaintiff to file suit with the clerk of
the court and then wait for the federal marshal to serve the defendant
personally with the summons and complaint.7 Personal service included res-
idential service, meaning that the summons and complaint could be left with
a person of suitable age and discretion who also resided at the defendant's
dwelling house or usual place of abode. 8 The federal marshals were not
given the responsibility for serving every defendant. A court could appoint
special persons to serve. 9 Service could also be made by a person authorized
to serve process in a state court of general jurisdiction.' 0 The primary burden
for providing service, however, rested on the marshals.
5. Id.
6. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, 28 U.S.C. (1982). Parts of Rule 4, however, incorporated
by reference federal or state standards. When one of these permitted mail, a summons could
be mailed under such provision. The primary provision permitting service by mail was 4(d)(7),
which allowed any defendant who was a competent adult or business organization to be served
"in the manner prescribed by any statute of the United States or in the manner prescribed by
the law of the state in which the district court is held." Id. This meant then that a plaintiff
might use mail service if his state permitted it. See, e.g., ARK. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(8); IND. RuLE
TR. 4.1(A)(1); Omo R. Crv. P. 4.1(1).
7. Prior to the 1983 amendments, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a) stated:
(a) Summons: Issuance. Upon the filing of the complaint the clerk shall forthwith
issue a summons and deliver it for service to the marshal or to any other person
authorized by Rule 4(c) to serve it.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a), 28 U.S.C. (1982).
The marshal could also serve a defendant's agent. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1), 28 U.S.C.
(1982).
8. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1), 28 U.S.C. (1982).
9. See id. 4(c).
10. Id.
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This burden on the marshals became increasingly great as civil actions in
federal courts swelled in number. The combination of overwork and a limited
budget led to the recognition that something had to be done to alleviate the
marshals' plight." The marshals would eventually be relieved of their duty
as the primary servers of summonses, and this responsibility would be shifted
to plaintiffs or their counsels.' 2 Before this would happen, however, Rule 4
would have to revised, and that revision process would take a long and
circuitous course.
The revision of Rule 4 began according to standard procedures. 13 The
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference, which con-
tinuously studies the operation and effect of the rules of civil procedure,
initiated changes in Rule 4.14 The Committee then distributed a tentative
draft of proposed amendments to members of the bench and bar for com-
ment." Public hearings were held to allow testimony and further comment
on the proposal. 16 After the hearings, the Committee revised the preliminary
proposal. 7 A final draft of the amendments was submitted for approval to
the standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure. 8 After scrutiny,
the proposed amendments were approved, submitted to the Supreme Court,
and accepted. In April, 1982, the Supreme Court sent the proposed amend-
ments to Congress.' 9 Under the Rules Enabling Act, Congress had 90 days
to examine them before they became effective. 20 Congress did not allow the
proposed changes to become law. 21 Instead, citing complaints received about
them," it enacted legislation to postpone the effective date of the amendments
from August 1, 1982 until October 1, 1983, in order to study them further.Y
11. 128 CONG. REc. H9848, H9849 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982) (report on background and
intent of amendments to Rule 4 by Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4434, 4439-40.
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(a).
13. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, PRELxI.NARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES 4 AND 45 OF THE FEDERAL
RULES OF Crvn. PROCEDURE (1981), reprinted in 91 F.R.D. 139 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1981
PRELnNARY DRAFT]; see generally, Spaniol, Making Federal Rules: The Inside Story, 69 A.B.A.
J. 1645 (1983).
14. See 1981 PRELMnNARY DRAF--, supra note 13. See generally Spaniol, supra note 13. See
infra Appendix B.
15. See Spaniol, supra note 13, at 1645-47.
16. See SUPREME COURT AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, at 260.
17. Id. at 259-61.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 255-58.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
21. Act of Aug. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-227, 96 Stat. 246.
22. H.R. REP. No. 662, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982). The complaints which specifically
pertained to the mail service provision were about the use of registered and certified mail
methods. The concern about these methods was that their use would result in the entry of
unfair default judgments.
23. Act of Aug. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-227, 96 Stat. 246. The goal was to clarify ambiguities
in the rule in order to prevent court battles over them, which would prove costly.
1986]
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The Supreme Court's proposal had removed routine service from the
marshals and placed that responsibility in the hands of the plaintiff or the
plaintiff's counsel. 24 Congress feared, however, that the Court had left a
loophole whereby the marshals might still be routinely called to serve sum-
monses. 25 Critics of the amendments expressed a need to close this alleged
loophole. 26
The Court's proposal contained a general mail provision that allowed a
party the option to serve process by registered or certified mail with return
receipt requested and delivery restricted to the addressee. 27 The proposal
struck the existing rule's option which permitted a plaintiff to use state
methods for mail service, if available. 2 The reasons given by Congress for
rejecting registered and certified mail were that these methods provided a
flawed mail service that might not provide a defendant actual notice of
claims against him. 29 This was alleged to be so because a signature on a
return receipt might be illegible, a name on a receipt might differ slightly
from the name of the addressee, it might be difficult to determine whether
the mail was refused or unclaimed, mail carriers might not be diligent enough
to assure delivery to the correct person, and unfair default judgments would
result from their use. Despite criticisms of registered and certified mail,
Congress wanted state options for mailing preserved. 0
The Court had instituted a 120-day limit on service to encourage plaintiffs
and their counsels to act with diligence."' Congress criticized this provision
for alleged ambiguities. a2 The stated reasons were that it seemed uncertain
whether a dismissal without prejudice would bar a plaintiff from reinstituting
an action if the statute of limitations had run during the 120 days and
proper service had not been obtained.3 3 The Court had also proposed that
service would be deemed "made" with regard to the time provision on the
24. SuPREME CouRT AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, at 255-58.
25. Under the Supreme Court's proposal, subsection (c)(2)(B) required that upon a party's
request, the marshal, his deputy, or some person specially appointed by the court was required
to serve process "pursuant to any statutory provision expressly providing for service by a
United States marshal or his deputy." Congress noted that one such provision providing for
service by a United States marshal or his depupty was 28 U.S.C. § 569(b), which compelled
marshals to "execute all lawful writs, process and orders issued under authority of the United
States, including those of the courts ..... " As a result, any party could rely on 28 U.S.C. §
569(b) to use a marshal for service and thwart the intent of the amendments to limit the use
of marshals. H.R. REp. No. 662, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1982) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 569(b)
(1983)).
26. Id.
27. SuPREmE CouIRT AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, at 257.
28. Id. at 256.
29. H.R. REP. No. 662, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982). See infra Appendix C.
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(i).
31. SuPREmE COURT AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, at 258.
32. H.R. REP. No. 662, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1982).
33. Id.
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date that the process was "accepted, refused, or returned as unclaimed. '3 4
The words "returned as unclaimed" bothered Congress because a defendant
might have legitimate reasons for failing to claim mail, yet a plaintiff could
nevertheless recover a default judgment. 5 Congress' concern over the pos-
sibility of unfair default judgments was one of the stated reasons for its
insistence on further reviewing the amendments.16
Representatives of the Judicial Conference and the Department of Justice,
as well as others who had displayed concerns over the amendments, joined
in consultations with members of Congress to reconsider them. 7 California
Representative Edwards, whose state claimed to have a successful first-class
mail service procedure, managed these proceedings. 8 The goal of this col-
laboration was to provide more effective procedures for mail service than
those the Court had proposed.3 9 This group also sought to clarify the pro-
posed amendments' ambiguities in order to avoid costly court battles later
to resolve them.40 It was from this collaborative effort that Congress later
offered its own revised version of the rule. 41
Congress' version of the rule reinstated state-authorized mailing proce-
dures.4 2 The rule also adopted a first-class mail method for service that was
modeled after the California rule.43 Congress discarded altogether the reg-
istered and certified mail procedures recommended by the Court." The rule
maintained the 120-day limit to effect service, but added a clause to save a
34. SuPRnmE CouRT AMENDmEtrrS, supra note 2, at 258. See infra Appendix C.
35. H.R. REP. No. 662, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982).
36. Id.
37. 2 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTiCE, supra note 4, at 4.01133.-1] to [33.-3].
38. Id.
39. See H.R. REP. No. 662, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1982).
40. Id.
41. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-462, 96
Stat. 2527. See infra Appendix D.
42. Rule 4(c)(2)(C) states:
(C) A summons and complaint may be served upon a defendant of any class
referred to in paragraph (1) or (3) of subdivision (d) of this rule-
(i) pursuant to the law of the State in which the district court is held for the
service of summons or other like process upon such defendant in an action brought
in the courts of general jurisdiction of that State, or
(ii) by mailing a copy of the summons ....
FED. R. CIm. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(i), (ii).
43. 128 CONG. REc. H9848, H9850 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982) (report on background and
intent of amendments to Rule 4 by Rep. Edwards) (citing CAL. CODE Crv. P. § 415.30),
reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CoNo. & AD. NEWS 4434, 4439-40. It should be noted that
California law allows a plaintiff three years in which to serve a summons after filing the
complaint. See Siegel, Practice Commentary on Amendment of Federal Rule 4 With Special
Statute of Limitations Precautions, 96 F.R.D. 88, 103 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Siegel, Practice
Commentary].
44. 128 CoNG. REc. H9848, H9850 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982) (report on background and




case from dismissal if a plaintiff could show "good cause" for failing to
serve process within the allotted time.41 Congress rejected the Court's stip-
ulation of a conclusive date on which service would be deemed "made" for
purposes of the time provision, fearing that this language would lead to
unjust default judgments." Congress' choice to reject the Supreme Court
proposal must be evaluated in terms of reaching its stated goals for more
effective procedures and less ambiguous language. 47 If the rule fails to meet
these goals, which current practice suggests it has,48 other alternatives, in-
cluding the Supreme Court's proposal, should be reconsidered.
II. OPERATION OF THm FRST-CLASS MAIL PROVISION
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedures Amendments Act of 1982 became
effective in February 198349 and set into motion drastic changes in the service
of process in a federal civil action. Now, upon filing suit a plaintiff need
not wait for the marshal to serve the defendant. Instead Rule 4(a) shifts
responsibility for service directly to the plaintiff or his attorney. 0 The plain-
tiff may employ "any person who is not a party and is not less than 18
years of age" to make personal service on the defendant.5 ' Or, the plaintiff
has the option to serve the defendant by first-class mail.5 2
The procedure for using the first-class mail option is sequential. The
plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney begins by filing suit with the clerk of the
45. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(j). The Supreme Court proposal was very similar to the current
rule except that it did not include the provision for "good cause." The current rule also provides
that the request for dismissal may be on motion of a party, whereas the Supreme Court had
not inserted those words in the time limit provision. See SuPREME CoURT AMENDMENTS, supra
note 2, at 258.
46. The Supreme Court proposal of 40) read:
0) Summons: Time Limit for Service.
... If service is made by mail pursuant to Rule 4(d)(8), service shall be deemed
to have been made for purposes of this provision as of the date on which the
process was accepted, refused, or returned as unclaimed ....
See SuPREME CouRT AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, at 258.
47. Congress stated that the goal of reducing the role of the marshals was the primary
reason for changing the rule. Congress thought that the Supreme Court had not sufficiently
reduced the marshals' work by its proposed amendments. Congress voiced concern about
improper default judgments that might occur under the Court's proposal. The goal was to
reduce ambiguities in the rule and to review all of the criticisms that had been voiced about
employing registered and certified mail, the time provision, and other general concerns. H.R.
REP. No. 662, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4 (1982).
48. E.g., Siegel, supra note 3.
49. Pub. L. No. 97-462, 96 Stat. 2527 (1982). The Act was adopted on January 12, 1983
and became effective on February 26, 1983.




RULE 4: SERVICE BY MAIL
court 3.5 The clerk issues the summons to the filing party. 4 The plaintiff or
plaintiff's attorney must then mail to the defendant the summons and the
complaint, a stamped, self-addressed return envelope, and two copies of a
notice and acknowledgment form. 5 The purpose of the form is to provide
verification that the defendant has been served and takes the place of the
marshal's proof of service under the old rule.5 6 Once mailed, the plaintiff
simply waits for the defendant to sign and return the notice and acknowl-
edgment form.5 7 Once the plaintiff receives the executed form, the plaintiff
knows that service was made.
Although the procedure seems beyond reproach given a mail system that
is both economical and reliable, a closer examination reveals that this pro-
cedure is not always as clear, simple, and inexpensive as it might appear.
For instance, since delivery of service is by first-class mail, the plaintiff
receives no receipt verifying that the delivery has been completed.58 The
envelope could be lost, discarded with junk mail, or deliberately ignored by
the defendant.5 9 Even if the defendant reads the contents with good inten-
tions, ambiguities in the model notice and acknowledgment form could cause
misunderstandings, confusion, and failure to respond correctly or perhaps
to respond at allAO In the event the defendant does not respond, a second
service is required.6'
For the second service the litigant may not resort to state-authorized
methods, which might allow for use of registered or certified mail.62 Ac-
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(a) states:
(a) Summons: Issuance. Upon the filing of the complaint the clerk shall forthwith
issue a summons and deliver the summons to the plaintiff or the plaintiff's
attorney, who shall be responsible for prompt service of the summons and a copy
of the complaint.
54. Id.
55. Id. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). See generally Notice and Acknowledgment for Service by Mail, Form
18-A, infra note 125.
56. FED. R. CIrv. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). Under the 1982 version of the rule, the marshal had to
supply proof as required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(g), 28 U.S.C. (1982).
57. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii); see also infra Appendix D.
58. With first-class mail, a sender may pay an extra fee to receive a receipt of mailing, but
not one of delivery. To receive notice of delivery, an additional fee would be necessary to have
registered or certified delivery, which both provide verification of delivery and date of delivery.
UNITED STATES PosTAL SERVICE NOTICE 59, POSTAGE RATE FEES AND INFORMATION (Feb. 1985).
59. See, e.g., Billy v. Ashland Oil Inc., 102 F.R.D. 230, 232 (W.D. Pa. 1984). The defendants
received the summons but did not return the acknowledgment. Instead, they said that it was
not their policy to accept service under this provision. The defendants were notified a second
time by certified mail and again ignored the acknowledgment, though their authorized agent
had signed the receipt.
60. Armco, Inc. v. Penrod-Stauffer Bldg. Sys., 733 F.2d 1087, 1089 (4th Cir. 1984). Judge
Haynsworth stated that it was reasonable for defendants to misconstrue the words of the form
and do nothing except wait and perhaps incur a penalty.
61. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii).
62. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Sims, 100 F.R.D. 792, 794 (N.D. Ala. 1984). Judge Acker
said that if the plaintiff had even gone so far as to include the notice and acknowledgment
1986]
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cording to the language of the rule and the court decisions enforcing it, a
second service must be made personally.63 Litigants are therefore returned
to the original pre-amendment procedures, except that now there is no
marshal to provide personal service. Instead, it is likely that a plaintiff will
be forced to pay a private process server to do it."
What seemed a simple procedure on paper has in reality become a com-
plicated, confusing and potentially expensive one. The only way the pro-
cedure works at all is if the defendant willingly opens and reads the materials,
understands the procedure, and complies.65 The uncertainty of this procedure
leaves the plaintiff waiting and vulnerable.
Changes in the mail service provision of the rule are obviously necessary.
If service of process is made improperly, the court's exercise of jurisdiction
and its judgment or decree will be invalid unless the defendant waives the
defective process.6 6 The stakes for failing to effect proper service are high.
Before changes are made, however, the rule should be closely scrutinized.
Only then can a proper foundation be made for considering further revisions.
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE MAIL SERVICE PROVISION
A. Two Standards for Mail Service
As noted previously, the present version of Rule 4 is the one Congress
adopted to overcome the deficiencies it perceived in the proposal put forth
by the Supreme Court. Congress' version of Rule 4 creates a dichotomy in
mail service standards.67 The present rule permits a choice of mailing either
by the federal method or by available state law methods.6 8 The Court's
proposal only allowed mail service if the litigant used the federal mail
procedure.6 9 The Court's proposed rule also called for use of registered and
form with the mailing, plaintiff was then "locked in to" completing service by the federal rule
which requires personal delivery if a second service is required.
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). Armco, Inc. v. Penrod-Stauffer Bldg. Sys., 733 F.2d
1087 (4th Cir. 1984); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Sims, 100 F.R.D. 792 (N.D. Ala. 1984);
Billy v. Ashland Oil Inc., 102 F.R.D. 230 (W.D. Pa. 1984); see infra Appendix D.
64. Although the rule permits any nonparty over the age of eighteen to serve process, a
plaintiff's logical choices are now the plaintiff's attorney, a paralegal or other office employee
of the attorney, or a private process server. If the attorney does not wish to serve process or
to have process served by the attorney's office personnel, a plaintiff will probably have to hire
a private process server to serve the defendant personally.
65. Stranahan Gear Co. v. NL Indus., 102 F.R.D. 250, 252 (E.D. Pa. 1984). Judge Broderick
pointed out that the only means of enforcing the rule was the penalty provision against
defendants who force the plaintiff to incur costs of personal service.
66. 2 MooRE's FEDERALO PRAcncE, supra note 4, 4.09, at 4-110 to -112.
67. See supra notes 21-46 and accompanying text.
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C).
69. The Supreme Court proposal for mail service stipulated that, whereas other state law
methods could be used as alternatives for service, a litigant who chose to send a summons by
mail had no choice but to use the procedures outlined in the federal rule. See SUtREME COURT
AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, at 256.
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certified mail. 70 Congress, however, rejected registered and certified mail
because Congress thought that those methods lacked the requisite means of
providing a defendant with actual notice.71 Since a number of states authorize
registered and certified mail service,7 2 many litigants are now allowed to
choose those methods in a federal action anyway.73 This ironic situation
occurs despite Congress' insistence that those very same methods were unfit
for the federal rule.7 4 By reinstating the choice of state law procedures 5
Congress has defeated its own purpose.
Rule 4 has two standards for mail service: (1) the federal method, using
first-class mail,7 6 and (2) state methods, often including registered and cer-
tified mail.7 7 Congress approved first-class mail because it thought the method
was more capable of providing a defendant actual notice. 71 If the defendant
executes and returns to the plaintiff the notice and acknowledgment form,
the plaintiff can be reasonably assured that service was made. It would
appear, however, that some of the same questions can exist with first-class
mail service as were alleged to exist with registered or certified mall service.
The defendant's signature on the notice and acknowledgment form can be
illegible, or the signature may differ slightly from the name of the addressee,
or the delivery may have gone to the wrong person. Still, if the notice and
acknowledgment form comes back to the plaintiff, there may be a slightly
greater chance than with registered and certified mail that actual notice was
given. 79
70. Id. at 257.
71. See H.R. REP. No. 662, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982). The Supreme Court decision
in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306 (1950) established certain minimum con-
stitutional standards for giving notice to parties. Although actual notice is not required, the
method of service must be reasonably likely to inform the defendant, even if it actually fails
to do so.
72. See, e.g., AiK. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(8); IND. RULE TR. 4.1; MD. RULE 2-121(a); MIcH. C.R.
2.105(A)(2); Omo R. Crv. P. 4.1(1); TENN. R. Civ. P. 4.04(12). Some states permit mail
delivery, but do not specify the type of mail to be used, thereby allowing registered and certified
mail. See, e.g., Ky. R. Civ. P. 4.01; MAss. R. Crv. P. 5(b); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-9-930 (Law.
Co-op. 1977). States frequently allow mail service for in rem actions. See, e.g., CoLo. R. Civ.
P. 4(g); KAN. CODE CrV. P. 60-307; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 506.160 (Vernon 1949). Some states
allow resort to mail service if with reasonable diligence the defendant cannot be served by
personal or residential service. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 801.11(l)(b) (West 1977).
73. 128 CONG. REc. H9848, H9850 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982) (report on background and
intent of amendments to Rule 4 by Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
4434, 4440-42.
74. Id.
75. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(i).
76. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C).
77. See sources cited supra note 72.
78. H.R. REP. No. 662, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982).
79. A signed form may provide slightly greater assurance of service than the signed receipt
one gets with certified mail.
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Allowing the two standards for mail service can pose technical problems
for a court. s0 One instance of these problems is when a plaintiff serves by
mail according to either a state or the federal rule, but confusion later
develops over which provision was actually employed.8' Regardless of any
potential problems which can develop by having two standards, if actual
notice was the goal and registered and certified mail were thought unfit to
provide actual notice, state law methods should not have been allowed at
all.
B. The Unacknowledged Form
If a plaintiff chooses to follow the federal procedure for mail service, and
the defendant does not comply with the obligation to execute and return
the acknowledgment of service,82 Rule 4 requires that a second service "shall
be made" on the defendant. 3 Uncertainties exist, however, concerning whether
there is one required method for a second service and also about the purpose
of the second service . 4
1. Specific Method Required for Service
The current rule provides that if the acknowledgment of service is not
received by the sender within twenty days of mailing, "service shall be made"
by personal delivery. 85 The validity of substituting a second mail delivery
has nevertheless been raised in several cases.8 6 The courts have uniformly
80. See, e.g., Armco, Inc. v. Penrod-Stauffer Bldg. Sys., 733 F.2d 1087, 1088 (4th Cir.
1984). After sending the notice and acknowledgment form and receiving no acknowledgment,
the plaintiff filed an affidavit stating that service had been made pursuant to the Maryland
rules. The district court found that the plaintiff had served the defendant pursuant to the
Maryland rules. However, Judge Haynsworth reversed the default judgment saying that plaintiff
had clearly served according to the federal rules and therefore had to complete service by
serving the defendant personally.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Sims, 100 F.R.D. 792 (N.D. Ala. 1984).
83. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii).
84. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Sims, 100 F.R.D. 792, 794 (N.D. Ala. 1984).
Although there seemed to be uncertainty on the part of the plaintiff about the methods
appropriate for a second service, Judge Acker was adamant in stating that if the first service
was made by the federal mail provision, personal service was the only manner of service allowed
in the event a second service was required. However, in Morse v. Elmira Country Club, 752
F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1984), Judge Davis did not question the method of the second service,
but he stated that its purpose was only to provide a foundation for the first mailed service.
This opinion is contrary to that in Billy v. Ashland Oil Inc., 102 F.R.D. 230, 234 (W.D. Pa.
1984), where the second service was viewed as necessary to having valid service.
85. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii).
86. See, e.g., Armco, Inc. v. Penrod-Stauffer Bldg. Sys., 733 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1984);
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Sims, 100 F.R.D. 792 (N.D. Ala. 1984); Billy v. Ashland Oil
Inc., 102 F.R.D. 230 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
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adhered strictly to the language of the rule and have required personal service,
even when the defendant had received actual notice. 87
One case in which the language of the rule was adhered to strictly was
Armco, Inc. v. Penrod-Stauffer Building Systems.8 The Armco court ac-
knowledged that "[w]hen the process gives the defendant actual notice of
the pendancy of the action, the rules, in general, are entitled to a liberal
construction. "8 9 It further noted that not all technical violations may in-
validate the service when actual notice was given. ° The court still invalidated
the second service, declaring that "the rules are there to be followed, and
plain requirements for the means of effecting service of process may not be
ignored." 9'
Personal service has even been required in a case where the defendant
previously received actual notice not once, but two times.92 In Billy v. Ashland
Oil Inc.,91 the defendants received the summons but did not return the ac-
knowledgment. 94 Instead, they said that it was not their policy to accept
service under this provision. 95 Plaintiff served process a second time using
certified mail and received a returned receipt signed by defendants' authorized
agent.9 Despite having given actual notice twice, the plaintiff was required
to serve the defendants a third time personally.97
One commentator has pointed out that the rule's failure to allow the use
of mail for a second service may have been an oversight in drafting rather
than an intentional exclusion. 9 The legislative history lends support to this
supposition." The history states that if the form is not acknowledged, "an-
other method of service authorized by law is required."''  In a different
paragraph the history states that if the acknowledgment is not returned,
"then service must be effected through some other means provided for in
87. See Armco, 733 F.2d 1087; Federal Deposit Ins. Co., 100 F.R.D. 792; Billy, 102 F.R.D.
230.
88. 733 F.2d 1087, 1089 (4th Cir. 1984).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1089. In this particular situation Judge Haynsworth found that because of the
ambiguous wording in the notice and acknowledgment form, it was reasonable for defendants
not to respond. Even though defendants had actual notice, he nevertheless insisted that the
rule be strictly interpreted and applied. Id.
92. Billy, 102 F.R.D. 230.
93. 102 F.R.D. 230 (W.D. Pa. 1984).




98. See Vairo, supra note 3, at 33.
99. See 128 CONG. REc. H9848, H9849 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982) (report on background
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the Rules." 10' The history therefore runs counter to the conclusion that the
second service must be by personal delivery. No sound reasons support the
rule that a second attempt at service should be restricted to personal de-
livery. 102
A plaintiff may be able to recover from a defendant costs of personal
delivery, 0 3 provided the defendant cannot show good cause for failing to
acknowledge the first service of process. 0 4 A plaintiff does, however, have
to move to recover costs, perhaps entailing legal fees which could even
exceed those costs.10 If a plaintiff does win a judgment, he must collect on
it. The mail service provision may therefore generate costs for litigants which
far exceed the price of a stamp.
2. Two Views of the Purpose of the Second Delivery
Although courts have been consistent about requiring personal delivery of
the summons and complaint following unacknowledged first-class mail de-
livery, 0 6 opinions diverge on the purpose of the second delivery.1 07 The
purpose of the second delivery is perceived either as effecting service of
process following an unacknowledged and therefore invalid mail delivery, 0 8
or affirming a received and therefore effective service of process despite the
fact that the service of process was not acknowledged. 09 The rule does not
contain a clear statement of when service is legally effective." 0 If one cannot
tell when service is effective, the purpose behind the second delivery is open
to question."'
A correlation appears to exist between a court's position and the procedural
posture of the case that is at stake.' 2 An examination of cases involving
101. Id.
102. Vairo, supra note 3, at 33.
103. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(D) states:
Unless good cause is shown for not doing so the court shall order the payment
of the costs of personal service by the person served if such person does not
complete and return within 20 days after mailing, the notice and acknowledgment
of receipt of summons.
104. Id.
105. 28 U.S.C.A., FED. R. Civ. P. 4 practice commentaries on Rule 4, at 37 (West Supp.
1985).
106. See Vairo, supra note 3.
107. Compare, e.g., Armco, Inc. v. Penrod-Stauffer Bldg. Sys., 733 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir.
1984) with Morse v. Elmira Country Club, 752 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1984). See also Bell v. London,
580 F. Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
108. See, e.g., Armco, Inc. v. Penrod-Stauffer Bldg. Sys., 733 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1984).
109. See Morse v. Elmira Country Club, 752 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1984).
110. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii).
11 I. Taggart, Changing Federal Procedures in Serving Summonses and Complaints, 29 PRc.
LAW. 23, 28-32 (1983).
112. See, e.g., Armco, Inc. v. Penrod-Stauffer Bldg. Sys., 733 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1984);
Morse v. Elmira Country Club, 752 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1984).
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judicially disfavored default judgments uncovers the fact that the first view,
that a defendant can defeat the mail-delivered service of process simply by
not acknowledging it, is consistently held." 3 These courts have sometimes
openly admitted their distaste for rewarding a defendant's complicity in
spoiling the service by mail." 4 Nevertheless, these courts have viewed an
unacknowledged mail service as invalid." 5 If the unacknowledged mail service
is invalid, this then implies that the required personal delivery is necessary
to make valid service of process.
Two courts, however, have taken a different view when confronted with
the possibility of a dismissal after the statute of limitations had expired." 6
These decisions arose in diversity actions, where state law governs the com-
mencement of the action." 7 In a state where the rule is that service of process
rather than filing a complaint commences an action, a plaintiff could lose
the opportunity to have a case tried unless the defendant is served prior to
the tolling of the statute." 8 When a plaintiff was faced with this likelihood,
two courts held that service was complete when the mail service was re-
ceived.1" 9 The two courts held that the purpose of personal delivery is only
to affirm the already completed, though unacknowledged, mail service. 20
One court explicitly stated that though personal service would provide a
foundation for the mail service, personal service was nevertheless "irrelevant
for valid and effective service."' 2' Under this view, the defendant who ignores
the mail service in hopes that the statute of limitations will run before
personal service can be made is out of luck.
Holding that personal delivery is necessary to complete service is the only
fair construction of the rule's intent.'2 The rule states that if service by mail
is not acknowledged, "service shall be made."' 2 3 It does not state "affir-
mation of service" shall be made. Nothing in the rule suggests that the
second delivery is simply to inform a defendant that the case will proceed
113. E.g., Armco, 733 F.2d at 1089; Billy, 102 F.R.D. at 234; Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.,
100 F.R.D. at 795.
114. See, e.g., Billy, 102 F.R.D. at 234.
115. Armco, 733 F.2d at 1089; Billy, 102 F.R.D. at 234; Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 100
F.R.D. at 797.
116. Morse v. Elmira Country Club, 752 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1984); Bell v. London, 580 F.
Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
117. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer
& Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
118. See Walker, 446 U.S. 740; Ragan, 337 U.S. 530.
119. Morse, 752 F.2d at 41; Bell, 580 F. Supp. at 63-64.
120. Morse, 752 F.2d at 41. Judge Davis held that the second service is simply to ensure
that the defendant receives actual notice, but that the second service is irrelevant if the mail
service is received, even though unacknowledged. See also Bell, 580 F. Supp. at 63-64.
121. Morse, 752 F.2d at 40.
122. See Taggart, supra note 111, at 30.
123. FED. R. Crv. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii).
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in spite of his failure to acknowledge. 124 The notice and acknowledgment
form also instructs that a defendant need not answer the complaint if the
form is not acknowledged. 25 The legislative history advises:
124. This was the construction of the rule proposed in the Advisory Committee's preliminary
draft, rejected and not explicitly set out in the final draft. However, the Supreme Court
proposal included a provision that when an envelope was returned "refused," then plaintiff
was to follow with a first-class mailing informing the defendant of the action and that the case
would proceed in spite of the refusal. Compare, e.g., 1981 PRELIMNARY DRAFT, supra note 13
with SuPREmE COURT AMENDMENTS, supra note 2. See infra Appendices B & C.
125.
Form 18-A
NOTICE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT FOR SERVICE BY MAIL
United States District Court for Southern District of New York
Civil Action, File Number_
A.B., Plaintiff
B . PNotice and Acknowledgment of Receipt
v. f" of Summons and Complaint
C.D., DefendantI
NOTICE
To: (insert the name and address of the person to be served.)
The enclosed summons and complaint are served pursuant to Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
You must complete the acknowledgment part of this form and return one copy of the
completed form to the sender within 20 days.
You must sign and date the acknowledgment. If you are served on behalf of a corporation,
unincorporated association (including a partnership), or other entity, you must indicate under
your signature your relationship to that entity. If you are served on behalf of another person
and you are authorized to receive process, you must indicate under your signature your authority.
If you do not complete and return the form to the sender within 20 days, you (or the party
on whose behalf you are being served) may be required to pay any expenses incurred in serving
a summons and complaint in any other manner permitted by law.
If you do complete and return this form, you (or the party on whose behalf you are being
served) must answer the complaint within 20 days. If you fail to do so, judgment by default
will be taken against you for the relief demanded in the complaint.
I declare, under penalty of perjury, that this Notice and Acknowledgment of Receipt of
Summons and Complaint will have been mailed on (insert date).
Signature
Date of Signature
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF RECEIPT OF SUMMONS
AND COMPLAINT
I declare, under penalty of perjury, that I received a copy of the summons and of the






FED. R. Civ. P. App. of Forms, Form 18-A (Notice and Acknowledgment of Service by Mail)
[hereinafter Form 18-Al.
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If the proper person receives the notice and returns the acknowledgment,
service is complete. If the proper person does not receive the mailed
form, or if the proper person receives the notice but fails to return the
acknowledgment form, another method of service authorized by law is
required. 126
Despite these contrary expressions, the rule's silence on when service is
complete has spawned the view that service is complete when the first-class
mail delivery of service is received. 27
The reasoning behind this contrary view is explained by Judge Davis in
the case of Morse v. Elmira Coitntry Club. 28 Judge Davis emphasized that
Congress included only a part of the California model rule in the federal
rule. 29 A section of that model, omitted from the federal rule, reads: "[s]ervice
of a summons pursuant to this section is deemed complete on the date a
written acknowledgment of receipt of summons is executed, if such ac-
knowledgment thereafter is returned to the sender."' 30 Since this section was
not included in the federal rule, Judge Davis reasoned that Congress intended
service to be complete when received, even if not acknowledged.' 3' Judge
Davis is probably correct that Congress did not intend to include in the rule
a stipulation of when service is completed. 32 The reason which he attributes
to Congress for this omission may not be the actual one, however. A close
examination of the rule's history offers another, stronger possibility. 33
The Advisory Committee's preliminary draft contained a stipulation as to
when registered or certified mail service was complete, stating: "[t]he return
receipt or the returned envelope showing refusal or failure to claim shall
constitute prima facie evidence of the service of process."' 34 The preliminary
draft's time limit provision also stated: "[ilf service is made by mail pursuant
to Rule 4(d)(8), service shall be deemed to have been obtained for the
purposes of this provision as of the date on which the process was accepted,
refused, or returned as unclaimed."' 35 The Court's final draft struck the
stipulation from the mail provision, though the final draft retained the
stipulation in the time provision. 36 Congress rejected even that one stipu-
126. See 128 CONG. REc. H9848, H9850 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982) (emphasis added) (report
on background and intent of amendments to Rule 4 by Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4434, 4440.
127. Morse, 752 F.2d at 41.
128. 752 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1984).
129. Id. at 40-41.
130. CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 415.30(c) (emphasis added).
131. Morse, 752 F.2d at 41.
132. See 128 CONG. REc. H9848, H9850 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982) (report on background
and intent of amendments to Rule 4 by Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4434, 4440.
133. See, e.g., 1981 PRELMNARY DRAFr, supra note 13, at 146; SUPREME COURT AMEND-
MENTS, supra note 2, at 256-57; 128 CONG. REc. H9848, H9850 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982) (report
on background and intent of amendments to Rule 4 by Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4434, 4440.
134. See 1981 PRELIMINARY DRAFTsr, supra note 13, at 146.
135. Id. at 148.
136. See SUPREME COURT AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, at 256-58.
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lation, reasoning that an unclaimed registered or certified mailing could
result in a default judgment despite the fact that a defendant's reasons for
allowing the mail to go unclaimed would be unknown. 3 7
When Congress rejected registered and certified mail in favor of first-class
mail, Congress did not include a statement of when service would be deemed
effective. 3 ' Congress probably recognized that the same possibility for unfair
default judgments could occur with first-class mail as with registered or
certified mail. 39 If the rule is construed to mean that service is complete
when the mail is received, a plaintiff could secure a default judgment after
testifying that a first-class mailing had occurred.' 40 Lurking behind Judge
Davis's position, therefore, is the possibility of exactly the kind of default
judgments that the Congress tried to avoid.' 4'
Two conflicting sets of standards now exist on the question of when
service is obtained.142 Both views are being used to keep cases alive in the
courts, but they rest on opposite premises. 41 If this divergence of opinions
continues, the only thing that appears certain is more confusion concerning
the Rule 4 first-class mail provision.
C. Technicalities May Foil Service
Morse v. Elmira Country Club'44 also broached the question of whether
a plaintiff can use registered or certified mail when exercising the mail option
under the federal provision. Rule 4 explicitly calls for first-class mail.' 4s
Although the plaintiff in Morse used certified rather than the required first-
class mail, Judge Davis apparently found this diversion from the rule to be
137. See generally 128 CONG. REC. H9848 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982) (report on background
and intent of amendments to Rule 4 by Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS. 4434.
138. See FED. R. Crv. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii).
139. See generally 128 CONG. REc. H9848 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982) (report on background
and intent of amendments to Rule 4 by Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws. 4434.
140. Presumably a plaintiff could go into court 20 days after a mailing and claim a default
judgment, provided the acknowledgment had not come back. See generally, Taggart, supra
note 111. Of course, a reasonable time would be somewhat more than 20 days after mailing,
due to allowing adequate time for mailing in each direction.
141. See generally 128 CONG. Rac. H9848 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982) (report on background
and intent of amendments to Rule 4 by Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4434.
142. Compare, e.g., Armco, Inc. v. Penrod-Stauffer Bldg. Sys., 733 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir.
1984) with Morse v. Elmira Country Club, 752 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1984).
143. Compare, e.g., Morse v. Elmira Country Club, 752 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1984) with Armco,
Inc. v. Penrod-Stauffer Bldg. Sys., 733 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1984).
144. 752 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1984).
145. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii).
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permissible.'4 In Arroyo v. Wheat, 47 however, defendants moved to quash
service when it was made by certified rather than by first-class mail. 48 District
Court Judge Reed pointed out correctly that Congress, in adopting the
amendments to Rule 4, rejected the Supreme Court proposal for a mail
provision which called for registered and certified mail. 49 Judge Reed there-
fore granted the plaintiffs a time extension in which to effect service by
personal delivery in order to overcome the technical defect of using certified,
rather than first-class, mail. 50 No sound reasons exist or were articulated
by Judge Reed why registered or certified mail could not be used in lieu of
first-class mail.'5' After Wheat, however, plaintiffs should be aware that use
of a type of mail other than first-class may be drawn into question. 52
Other technical questions about the mail provision open further possibilities
for foiling service. One concern is whether a technical failure, such as a
typographical error on the notice and acknowledgment form, will void the
service.' 53 In Morse, Judge Davis found that a minor error which did not
have any significant impact on the defendant's behavior did not merit voiding
the mail service. 54 Another unresolved issue is whether a plaintiff may recover
costs of personal service when the plaintiff failed to include a stamped, self-
addressed envelope with the mailed service. 5  Since the rule requires that
the envelope be enclosed, a defendant who did not receive one could foil
the service and perhaps escape the costs of personal service as well. 56
These questions point out important lessons about the new rule. Service
of process by mail requires technical correctness. Requiring an affirmative
act by a defendant also increases the likelihood of technical failures. 5 7 These
openings for failure provide plaintiffs with more incentives to simply avoid
the mail option.
D. Form 18-A, Notice and Acknowledgment for Service by Mail
A plaintiff who chooses to serve process by mall is likely to worry about
whether the defendant will acknowledge the service. The plaintiff may not
understand, however, that the notice and acknowledgment form itself may
146. Judge Davis said that the certified mailing was "unnecessary," but he did not elaborate
on whether or not it was correct. Morse, 752 F.2d at 36 n.2.
147. 102 F.R.D. 516 (D. Nev. 1984).
148. Id. at 517.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.; Siegel, supra note 3, at 49.
152. Wheat, 102 F.R.D. at 517.
153. Morse v. Elmira Country Club, 752 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1984).
154. Id. at 42.





be an obstacle to a well-meaning defendant's attempt to comply.I's A defend-
ant's first hurdle in comprehending the ambiguous form is to determine how
much time he has in which to execute and return the form. The form states
"return one copy of the completed form to the sender within 20 days."' 59
The form does not explain when the twenty days begin to run. The relevant
date could be: (1) twenty days from the plaintiff's attested mailing date
provided on the form, (2) twenty days from the date on the postmark,
provided there is one, (3) twenty days from the day the mail carrier delivers
the mailing, or (4) twenty days from the time defendant opens the envelope
and reads its contents. 6 Although the rule is ambiguous, the language "20
days after the [plaintiff's] date of mailing" probably means that a defendant
should follow the plaintiff's attested date of mailing rather than one of the
other three possibilities. Even though the form instructs that the defendant
has twenty days,' 6' the rule states that the plaintiff should receive the returned
form within twenty days of plaintiff's date of mailing. 62 The form and rule
are inconsistent on this important time factor.
The requirement that the plaintiff provide two dates on the form creates
more confusion about time parameters.16 This obligation may even imply
a fifth possibility of when a defendant's time to respond to the form begins
to run. The defendant sees both the signature date and the mailing date.' 64
These may be different since a plaintiff may sign the form on one date, but
plan to mail it on another. The defendant may therefore become confused
about which, if either, of the two dates controls his time to respond.
Another source of possible confusion is that the form does not show a
clear need to respond. 65 The form states, "If you do complete and return
this form, you ... must answer the complaint within 20 days."' 66 As Judge
Haynsworth of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out in Armco,
Inc. v. Penrod-Stauffer Building Systems, "the notice explicitly told [the
defendants] that they need do nothing if they did not accept and acknowledge
service, though they might be required to pay the cost of service by some
other means."'' Judge Haynsworth found that it was reasonable for defend-
158. Siegel, supra note 3, at 49.
159. Form 18-A, supra note 125.
160. Siegel, supra note 3, at 49; see Form 18-A, supra note 125.
161. Form 18-A, supra note 125.
162. FED. R. Crv. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). The rule is still unclear since plaintiff's date of mailing
could be construed to mean the date of actual posting or the attested date of mailing provided
on the form.
163. Taggart, supra note 111, at 25-27.
164. Form 18-A, supra note 125. At the end of the final paragraph under "Notice," the
plaintiff must declare that the Summons and Complaint "will have been mailed on" a specific
date. Id.
165. See Form 18-A, supra note 125; Armco, Inc. v. Penrod-Stauffer Bldg. Sys., 733 F.2d
1087, 1089 (4th Cir. 1984).
166. Form 18-A, supra note 125 (emphasis added).
167. 733 F.2d 1087, 1089 (4th Cir. 1984).
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ants to choose to do nothing and simply incur a penalty. 68 Yet as one
commentator has pointed out, that penalty may only amount to a mere
"wrist slap" in some cases. 69
If the defendant does plan to return the form, the defendant will find
that the sender's address is not on the form itself, 70 but on the return
envelope only.' 7 ' If the envelope was accidentally not enclosed, or if the
defendant has misplaced it, the defendant may not be able to acknowledge
service. Although the address of the plaintiff's attorney should be on the
summons, 7 2 the attorney and the sender may be two different people since
the rule allows any nonparty over eighteen years of age to be the sender. 7
Therefore, simply returning the form to the correct person may even pose
a problem. One commentator has suggested that a defendant would be wise
not to use the provided envelope with its prepaid postage at all, but should
resort to personal delivery or registered or certified mail. 74 These alternatives
are more appropriate means for delivering the form back to the sender
because they at least provide a defendant with a record of his acknowledg-
ment.
The form instructs the defendant: "If you do complete and return this
form, you.., must answer the complaint within 20 days."' 73 The question
again, however, is twenty days from when? 76 Rule 12(a) instructs that "[a]
defendant shall serve his answer within 20 days after the service of the
summons and complaint upon him" but it says nothing about a mailing. 77
Being unable to determine exactly when a defendant is served is problematic
both to a defendant and to a plaintiff. 7
Because a plaintiff can only guess the date when process will be delivered
by first-class mail, he also will have to speculate about when to expect an
answer and when he will be entitled to a default judgment if there is no
answer. The legislative history states that the defendant must provide on the
168. Id.
169. Vairo, supra note 3, at 34. See also Eden Foods, Inc. v. Eden's Own Prods., Inc., 101
F.R.D. 96 (E.D. Mich. 1984), where plaintiff was awarded $59.25.
170. See Form 18-A, supra note 125.
171. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii).
172. Taggart, supra note 111, at 29.
173. FED. R. Cirv. P. 4(c)(2)(A). In the following circumstances, service can be by a marshal,
or by a person specially appointed by the court: when a party is proceeding in forma pauperis,
or is a seaman, or an office or agency of the U.S., or in the event a court has some other
reason for ensuring that service is properly effected. Id. 4(c)(2)(B).
174. Taggart, supra note 111, at 27.
175. Form 18-A, supra note 125.
176. See Siegel, supra note 3, at 49.
177. FED. R. Crv. P. 12(a).
178. There are other possibilities for when a person might be deemed served with first-class
mail service of process. A construction might be that it is the day when the mail carrier delivers
the mail, the day the mail is picked up by the defendant, or the day the defendant opens the
mail. See Taggart, supra note 11, at 28.
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acknowledgment the date and place of service, 79 but the form only calls for
place of service. 80 Although the form provides the defendant a place for
the signature date, 8' the signature date need not be the same as the service
date-assuming the defendant could know the service date. Therefore, even
if the form is acknowledged, the plaintiff may never know the exact date
on which the defendant was served. The practical result of this uncertainty
is that the plaintiff will not be able to have a default judgment entered until
twenty days after the form comes back, rather than twenty days after it was
sent. 182
A plaintiff is required only to send a notice and acknowledgment form
which conforms "substantially" to the model provided with the rule.'8 3 A
plaintiff could conceivably draft a similar form, correcting many of these
ambiguities in advance. Most plaintiffs are, however, likely to rely on the
model and thus fall prey to its pitfalls. High stakes are attached to the
form's proper execution and return.'8 4 Litigants, therefore, need a form that
is designed to facilitate, rather than to hinder, the form's use.
E. How the Time Limit Affects Mail Service
In order to understand the effects of the new time limit provision on mail
service, one must know the reasons for its existence and how it works. The
time limit was enacted because courts needed some means to insure that
plaintiffs would be diligent once responsibility for service to process shifted
from the marshals to the plaintiffs. 8  A plaintiff's prompt service is im-
portant for moving litigation efficiently through the courts.' s6 To meet this
need, Rule 4 was amended to require a plaintiff to serve process within 120
days of filing an action.' 87 The new provision requires dismissal if a plaintiff
cannot show "good cause" for this failure. 8  Since a dismisssal for not
179. 128 CONG. REc. H9848, H9851 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982) (report on background and
intent of amendments to Rule 4 by Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4434, 4446.
180. See Form 18-A, supra note 125. Under the section entitled "Acknowledgment of Receipt
of Summons and Complaint," the defendant must declare that he received a copy of the
summons and complaint, but the form then requests only that the defendant "insert address."
181. See Form 18-A, supra note 125.
182. Taggart, supra note 11, at 29.
183. FED. R. Ciw. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii).
184. If the form is not returned, the plaintiff will have to pay to have defendant served
personally. Id. Further, with the divergence among courts as to when service is complete, a
plaintiff could conceivably lose his right to sue, e.g., if he misses the deadline for the statute
of limitations.
185. 128 CONG. REc. H9848, H9850 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982) (report on background and




188. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(j).
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meeting the time limit is without prejudice, a plaintiff has the option to
refile the action.8 9 If, however, the statute of limitations has run prior to
the dismissal, the plaintiff is barred from bringing the action again. 19
Rule 4 states that the case can be dismissed on the court's own initiative
after notice to a party.191 Although the rule is ambiguous, 192 the plaintiff
will presumably be given an opportunity for a hearing and to respond. 193
The rule does not specify what constitutes a "good cause" defense for failing
to serve within the time limit. One example, however, would be the defend-
ant's evasion of service. 94 The legislative history instructs that "reasonable"
efforts to effect service are required. 195 The plaintiff who can demonstrate
his reasonable efforts is entitled to seek an enlargement of time under Rule
6(b),' 9 6 or to oppose a dismissal.
The time limit has special implications for plaintiffs who use first-class
mail to serve the summons. Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) instructs that if a defendant
does not acknowledge service of process by mail within twenty days, a
plaintiff "shall" serve the defendant personally. 97 A plaintiff must therefore
spend at least twenty days of the allotted 120 under the time limit provision
just waiting for the return acknowledgment to assure that service was made. 98
The mail could simply be delayed in either getting to or returning from the
defendant, thus forcing the plaintiff to wait even longer to be sure the
defendant was served. The ambiguities about time deadlines found in the
notice and acknowledgment form may add to the plaintiff's waiting time. 99
A plaintiff may be wise to be patient well beyond twenty days in the event
the defendant is only late in acknowledging rather than not acknowledging
189. Id.
190. See Siegel, Practice Commentary, supra note 43, at 114.
191. FED. R. Cwv. P. 4(j).
192. Id.
193. Taggart, supra note 111, at 32.
194. Id.
195. 128 CoNG. REc. H9848, H9851 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982) (report on background and
intent of amendments to Rule 4 by Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4434, 4442.
196. Rule 6(b) states:
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order
of court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time,
the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without
motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the
expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order,
or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit the
act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect; but
it may not extend the time for taking any action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b),
(d) and (e), 60(b), and 74(a), except to the extent and under the conditions stated
in them.
FED. R. Crv. P. 6(b).
197. Id. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii).
198. Siegel, Practice Commentary, supra note 43, at 113-14.
199. Taggart, supra note 111, at 27.
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at all. A hasty move to make personal service could prove wasteful. If,
however, the mail service is never acknowledged, the plaintiff has relin-
quished an important block of time during which preparations for personal
service could have been begun. Assuming that a plaintiff mailed the summons
immediately after filing the complaint, and that a plaintiff allows the defend-
ant reasonable leeway to acknowledge, about ninety days remain to serve
personally a defendant who does not acknowledge the mail service. This
amount of time should be sufficient to complete personal service. If ninety
days is not enough time in which to serve a defendant, the time limit could
be fatal to the plaintiff's case. 200 The plaintiff may avoid such a fatality by
requesting a time extension in advance of the expiration of the period. 20'
A plaintiff needs to carefully document all attempts to serve in the event
the plaintiff has to ask for a time extension or defend a dismissal. 202 A
district court judge is likely to be the final authority in determining whether
plaintiff's efforts to complete service were reasonable. 203 District court judges
may have varying perceptions of what constitutes reasonableness under the
rule. 204 If the plaintiff engages a private process server to personally deliver
a second service, a judge may not find that person as credible as a United
States marshal. 205 Proof of action taken may now more than ever be required.
A plaintiff should therefore act promptly and request a time extension well
in advance of the expiration of the 120 days if it becomes evident that
additional time to complete service will be required.
The time provision assumes that it is possible to determine when service
was made. If mail service is attempted, not acknowledged, and the plaintiff
is forced to serve the defendant personally, the rule again breaks down if
it is impossible to tell when service is effected. If service is effected when
the personal delivery is completed, then it must be accomplished in what
remains of the 120-day period. If, however, service is effected when the mail
service is received, then plaintiff could serve the defendant personally beyond
the 120-day time limit without penalty, allowing the plaintiff a significant
amount of additional latitude. 206 The two interpretations of when service is
effected therefore leave open to question the actual deadline for service. 207
200. Siegel, Practice Commentary, supra note 43, at 114-15.
201. FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b).
202. See Siegel, Practice Commentary, supra note 43, at 111-13.
203. Id. at 102.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 109-13.
206. See Morse v. Elmira Country Club, 752 F.2d 35, 39-41 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Taggart,
supra note 111, at 30-32.
207. The Morse case, 752 F.2d 35, is very recent and is the first Court of Appeals decision
to express this view, so it is too early to tell how widespread the use of this reasoning will
become.
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The need for a definitive answer on when service is obtained is clear. 20 8
Until litigants receive further guidance from the courts or Congress, the
plaintiff must be very careful initially in selecting the manner of service. If
time deadlines are a big concern in a particular case, plaintiffs may bypass
the mail service provision. This ambiguity provides yet another incentive for
the mail provision's disuse.
IV. To CORRECT OR To REJECT THE MAIL PROVISION
Failings in the rule are easy to point out; 2°9 proposing corrective measures
is another matter. 210 For any one service procedure to be simple and eco-
nomical, and at the same time failsafe for achieving actual notice, is ulti-
mately impossible.2 1' In fact, these are basically conflicting policy interests.
When a proposal is suggested to alleviate one problem, it only creates
another. Despite these inherent dilemmas, the current first-class mail pro-
vision must be made more useful to litigants or discarded entirely. If pro-
cedures are not made more effective, the provision will either continue to
cause problems for those involved in lawsuits or it will fall into disuse.212
If litigants do not use mail service, they will be deprived of the choice of
a low-cost, convenient federal procedure for serving summonses. Resort to
state-authorized procedures, having the attributes of economy and conven-
ience, may be possible, where they exist. 213 Citizens may otherwise be forced
into paying the cost of personal service, or not bringing suit.
To prevent the need for a choice between such extremes, the first-class
mail provision can either be made more useful by implementing certain
corrective measures, or it can be discarded in favor of other, possibly more
acceptable, methods. 2 4 Assuming that the first-class mail provision remains
in force, certain measures which could make the method work more effec-
tively deserve further study. One of the primary measures that could be
taken is to allow the use of state-authorized mail procedures as an alternative
means of serving a defendant the second time following an unacknowledged
208. See Taggart, supra note IlI, at 30-32.
209. See, e.g., Siegel, Practice Commentary, supra note 43; Taggart, supra note 111; Vairo,
supra note 3.
210. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 3; Siegel, Practice Commentary, supra note 43.
211. 128 CoNG. REC. H9848, H9848-50 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982) (report on background and
intent of amendments to Rule 4 by Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4434, 4435, 4438-39.
212. Admonitions by various commentators about using the rule seem to suggest that litigants
could become skeptical of it. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 3, at 49.
213. See, e.g., Omo R. Civ. P. 4.1. Ohio authorizes the use of certified mail which is sent
out by the clerk of the court.
214. The methods of registered and certified mail were recommended by the Supreme Court.
See SuP.EmE COURT AMENDMENTs, supra note 2, at 256-57.
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first-class mail service. 21s Many litigants already use state methods such as
registered and certified mail for the first service. Allowing a second service
by other than personal delivery would result in less waste of both money
and energy than forcing plaintiffs to serve personally.
For the rule to state when service is complete would increase certainty
surrounding service procedures. A direct statement that service is complete
only if the acknowledgment is returned by the defendant and received by
the plaintiff would help implement Congress' goal of providing actual no-
tice. 216 To include such a provision, however, does not resolve the question
of when a defendant is served for timing purposes. To clarify timing con-
cerns, separate provisions will be required to instruct when a plaintiff can
obtain a default judgment, 2 7 and how problems should be handled regarding
the interaction of service of process and statutes of limitation.21,8
Further corrective measures would also require complete revision of the
notice and acknowledgment form. The form needs a stronger tone to make
defendants aware of the need to respond. Each of the ambiguities and
inconsistencies previously discussed would need to be corrected. Measures
should be taken in advance of a revised form's distribution to ensure that
the rule, the form, and the procedures interact properly.
The suggestions for corrective measures, if studied and further developed,
might prove helpful. Other recommendations on how to improve the rule
will no doubt be forthcoming.2 9 Both the Supreme Court and Congress
likely will receive pressure to address the mail provision's shortcomings.220
Since revisions take time, money and energy to study and to implement,
any suggested revisions would have to have great potential for success.
Further revision of the first-class mail provision would, however, be un-
wise. The first-class mail provision for service of process engages a mail
method fraught with problems and ambiguities regardless of how many
times the rule is further amended. 22' Plaintiffs need a procedure that will be
likely to get a defendant's attention initially and one that will not depend
215. The present rule allows only a resort to personal service after an acknowledgment is
not returned. FED. R. Crv. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). The state law alternative could be added to provide
a choice for the second service.
216. If service is deemed completed only upon the return of the acknowledgment, rather
than upon the receipt of the mailing, this would be evidence of defendant's actual notice of
the service of process. See 128 CoNo. REc. H9848, H9850 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982) (report on
background and intent of amendments to Rule 4 by Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4434, 4439-40.
217. See Vairo, supra note 3, at 33.
218. Id.
219. See, e.g., Morse v. Elmira Country Club, 752 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1984) (revealing problems
with the rule which will likely come to the attention of the Advisory Committee); Armco, Inc.
v. Penrod-Stauffer Bldg. Sys., 733 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1984) (same).
220. Billy v. Ashland Oil Inc., 120 F.R.D. 230, 234 (W.D. Pa. 1984); Taggart, supra note
111, at 33-34; Vairo, supra note 3, at 33.
221. The questions such as when service is complete and when plaintiff's answering time
begins cannot really be known with first-class mail delivery. See Siegel, supra note 3, at 49.
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on the defendant's willingness to comply. 222 Plaintiffs need to have verifi-
cation that the defendant received service of process.m Plaintiffs also need
to be sure of the date on which the summons was delivered in order to
know the beginning date of defendant's answering time. 224 The first-class
mail method cannot meet these needs. Other methods should therefore again
be investigated. 22
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR A HYBRID MODEL
Rule 4 requires a more suitable alternative than first-class mail service for
providing defendants actual notice and plaintiffs a low-cost, convenient
means of obtaining actual notice. A proposal to finance reinstating the
marshals to their former positions as the primary process servers would
probably be unsuccessful. Private process servers now offer a substitute for
the marshals. The cost of engaging a private process server, however, is
great compared to that of mailing a first-class letter. A compromise method
using certified mail could form the basis of a new hybrid model provision
to help overcome problems in the current rule. 6
Using the mails for serving process has many attractive features, especially
now that a plaintiff or a plaintiff's attorney has both the authority and
responsibility to make service of process. Mail is simple, economical, and
highly reliable. Mail provides a way of keeping control of service of process
in the hands of the plaintiff, rather than a private process server who may
or may not be reliable and trustworthy. Mailing a summons also eliminates
the possibility of embarrassing encounters between process servers and
defendants.2 7 Certified mail has proven acceptable in many states as a fair
way to provide reasonable assurance that a defendant will have notice of
222. See, e.g., Billy, 102 F.R.D. 230.
223. Taggart, supra note 111, at 28.
224. Id.
225. The original drafts of the amendments sent to Congress would be a good place to start
in looking for other methods. See SuPREmE COURT AMENDMENTS, supra note 2; 1981 PRLIM-
INARY DRAr, supra note 13; infra Appendices B & C.
226. The basic cost for first-class mail is $.22. In contrast, personal service by a private
process server is likely to cost a minimum of $20. In one California case, the plaintiff expended
$307.32 for personal service. Sally Beauty Co. v. Nexxus Prod. Co., 578 F. Supp. 178 (N.D.
11. 1984). If a compromise method of service utilizing certified mail were adopted, the ordinary
cost of service would be about $1.70.
227. In Bell v. London, 580 F. Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), the plaintiff had served a former
husband who was an attorney. Judge Brieant commented on the man's failure to respond to
the mailed summons. He stated: "One may wonder whether, if some burly or scruffy profes-
sional process server had intruded in the presence of defendant's clients or law partners to slap
him with timely process, the complaint then would have been that recourse should have been
had to mail service. Service by mail avoids such confrontations and humiliations .... " Id.
at 63.
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claims against him. 228 For these reasons, the alternative of using mail is
worth retaining. Certified mail, one means proposed by the Supreme Court,
deserves further consideration for a hybrid model provision.
Understanding the mechanics of using certified mail is important to ap-
preciate the method's strengths and weaknesses for the purpose of service
of process. The purpose of certified mail is to provide a sender proof of
delivery. The Supreme Court proposed certified and registered mail with
return receipt requested and delivery restricted to the addressee. 229 Certified
mail is the least expensive of these two methods. 2 0 Registered mail's purpose
is to insure the value of an envelope's contents. Certified mail is therefore
more suitable than registered mail for sending a summons. The two methods
operate similarly. Because certified mail better serves the purpose of mailing
a summons and is also less expensive, certified mail alone is sufficient to
consider.
The sender of process by certified mail must take the envelope containing
the summons and complaint to a post office to have it stamped and to
obtain a receipt of mailing.23 I A receipt of mailing contains the date of
mailing and the name of the addressee. The current charge for sending mail
certified is the amount of first-class postage plus $.75 for certifying delivery.
The sender may pay an additional $.70 to receive a return receipt showing
to whom and when the envelope was delivered. Another $.20 will enable
the sender to know where the envelope was delivered.232 Once the sender
has given instructions and paid the required fees, the mail is sent on its way
and the sender goes home bearing the receipt of mailing. The sender knows
that soon either a return receipt or the returned envelope will come back.
Either way, a plaintiff has the assurance of knowing within three weeks that
the defendant was or was not served notice of the action.
The sender may also pay an additional $1.25 to have the delivery restricted
to the addressee. The mail carrier then personally delivers the envelope only
to the addressee, who is required to sign a receipt to claim it. The Postal
Service does not guarantee that delivery will be to the addressee, but restricted
delivery is reasonably assured. The mail carrier usually knows who lives at
an address. The carrier is also required to ask for the specific individual
whose name is on the envelope. If the carrier is suspicious that the person
claiming to be the addressee may be someone else, the carrier may insist
228. 128 CONG. REC. H9848, H9849 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982) (report on background and
intent of amendments to Rule 4 by Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4434, 4440.
229. SuP.FME CouRT AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, at 257.
230. The difference in cost is about $2.00.
231. Offices which regularly send letters by certified mail handle mailing procedures internally,
thus avoiding trips to the post office.
232. Rate information is contained in UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, NoTIcE 59, POSTAGE
RATES, FEES, AND INFORMATION (Feb. 1985).
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that the person come to the post office to collect the mail. If, however, the
delivery goes smoothly-which in most cases it will-the carrier simply
returns the signed receipt to the sender.23
This sequence of events occurs provided that the addressee is at home
and will accept the delivery. If the addressee is not at home when the delivery
is attempted, the carrier will leave a notice indicating the need to claim the
mail at the post office.214 The notice will show that the mail was sent certified,
restricted delivery, and will also show the zip code where the envelope
originated. If no one is at home, the addressee may upon receipt of the
notice authorize directly on the notice another person to go to the post
office to collect the mail. If the mail is not claimed within five days, a
second notice is left. If mail is not claimed within fifteen days of the first
delivery, it is returned to the sender marked "unclaimed." Mail can also be
refused, in which event the envelope is returned to the sender marked
"refused" and with the date of refusal. If an addressee has moved and
failed to leave a forwarding address with the post office, the sender is so
informed on the face of the returned envelope.
When certified mail with return receipt requested is sent without delivery
restricted to the addressee, the delivery procedure is slightly altered. If the
addressee is not at home, the carrier has the discretion to allow someone
else of suitable age to sign for and accept the mail. If no one is at home,
the addressee may, upon receipt of the notice, authorize directly on the
notice another person to go to the post office to collect the mail. Even
without such written authorization the Postal Service may use discretion to
allow someone other than the addressee to collect the mail. Otherwise, the
two procedures are the same.
Although no method of service will assure actual notice in every case,
certified mail offers the most certainty to the plaintiff without subjecting
him to potentially burdensome costs. The use of certified mail to effect
service of process offers: (1) a low-cost method of serving summonses; (2)
a method likely to gain defendant's attention; (3) reliable delivery procedures
reasonably capable of reaching the named defendant; (4) verification of
receipt of mailing; (5) verification of the date and place received; and (6)
efficiency in terms of time needed to determine whether the method actually
provided notice. While no method of service will be perfect, certified mail
service represents the best tradeoff between the dual goals of actual notice
and a simple, easy, low-cost method of service.
Delivery of process by certified mail should not, however, be restricted
to the addressee as the Supreme Court proposed. 235 The restriction is im-
233. If the mail carrier cannot effect delivery, the Postal Service allows 15 days for a letter
to be claimed. Then, it returns the letter to the sender.
234. For a copy of the claim receipt, see infra Appendix A.
235. SUPRiEME COURT AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, at 257.
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practical and may even prove a hindrance to service. Restricted delivery
forces a mail carrier to find the defendant at home, or otherwise to require
the defendant to go personally to the post office to collect the mail after
receiving notice of it, or to require the defendant's written authorization for
someone else to go to the post office to claim the mail for him. Without
this restriction, the carrier has discretion to permit someone other than the
defendant to claim the mail, allowing greater ease in delivery. The importance
normally attached to certified mail increases the likelihood that the person
who actually receives the mail will give it to the intended receiver. Restricted
delivery is therefore an unnecessary hurdle for a plaintiff when he can
accomplish delivery without it, and even at a slightly lower cost.
As noted previously, the major drawback to certified mail expressed by
Congress is the worry that it will result in inappropriate default judgments. 2 16
Although this concern has considerable merit, it should be noted that the
federal rules contain a procedure for remedying default judgments which
result from lack of notice. Rule 60 grants to the court wide discretion to
relieve a party from a final judgment for any reason justifying relief. The
rules therefore already provide the courts with power to rectify this prob-
lem.2 37
Adopting certified mail service, however, does not provide a complete
solution; additional modifications will be required. First, any amendment to
Rule 4 must explicitly identify a date upon which service of process is
effected. Since three eventualities may occur with certified mail, the date
need not be the same in each case. When certified mail is actually received,
the date of receipt-stated on the return form-seems the appropriate date
for effecting service. If the certified mail is refused, then upon receipt of
the refused envelope, the sender could be required to mail to the defendant
again-this time by first-class mail-a copy of the summons and complaint
and a notice of the consequences of default. Provided the plaintiff obtains
a certificate of mailing, the defendant could be deemed to have been served,
for example, ten days from the date of the certificate of mailing.2 s Finally,
if the certified mail goes unclaimed, then the plaintiff should have the option
of continuing to seek service by certified mail, or resort to personal service.
Under such a proposal the number of cases where personal service was
required would be limited. Whenever resort to personal service would be
necessary because a defendant did not claim mail, the rule could include a
penalty provision to enable a plaintiff to collect for the cost of personal
service. 23 9
236. H.R. REP. No. 662, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982).
237. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
238. See Omo R. Crv. P. 4.6(C), which has a similar provision for mail that is refused.
239. A penalty provision would discourage defendants from avoiding service merely by failing
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The current Rule 4 should be modified further to make certified mail the
exclusive method of mail service. If there is to be a federal mail provision,
the introduction of alternative mail methods is confusing and unnecessary.
Further, the majority of states which authorize service by mail utilize certified
mail, so the impact of the change in the rule should be minimal. The policy
behind the federal rules is to create uniformity throughout the federal courts.
This policy can be no better furthered than by establishing a single method
of service of process.
CONCLUSION
The responsibility of the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney to notify the
defendant of a pending action in federal court is still a relatively new
phenomenon. Congress' goal of providing plaintiffs with an effective, low-
cost method to fulfill this responsibility has not been achieved. Instead,
Congress' institution of the first-class mail provision in Rule 4 has often
returned plaintiffs to their pre-amendment position of having to serve a
defendant personally. Indeed, the costs of a private process server will likely
exceed that paid for service by a federal marshal under the old rule.
In order to alleviate this situation and prevent the disuse of mail service,
corrective measures should be taken to further amend Rule 4. Because of
the basic flaws in the first-class mail method, any corrections retaining first-
class service are likely to be futile. For the purpose of service of process,
certified mail provides a preferable alternative to first-class mail. If a certified
mail service proposal contains the modifications as outlined above, it offers
the best chance both to give actual notice to the defendant, and yet not
burden the plaintiff unduly.
ANN VARNON CROWLEY
to claim mail. A penalty provision would also equalize the burden on plaintiffs who receive
refused mail and would then only be required to send follow-up process by first-class mail. A
penalty provision would, therefore, make service by certified mail even more effective.
One way in which a plaintiff might try to prove that a defendant was avoiding service would
be to send the unclaimed process a second time by first-class mail. If the plaintiff obtained a
certificate of mailing as proof of sending the first-class mail, and if the mail did not come
back because the defendant had moved away, the plaintiff and courts could be reasonably
assured that the defendant had been avoiding the certified mail service. Ohio has a provision
which allows a recipient of unclaimed mail to send process by first-class mail. See Omo R.
Civ. P. 4.6(D). Personal service is not required, however, unless on the second occasion of
mailing the letter comes back. The proposal for the federal rule would require personal service
following unclaimed mail so as to assure actual notice.
19861





* IMPORTANT: Present this form to obtain your mail. ID required. Signature may be required.
You may notify your carrier or Post Office for redelivery or pick up your mail MAIL
after - M. lDate A-T :
0 REGISTERED QNUMBERED I CUSTOM (Omit Number) 0[INSUR D O-LETTER OFL IAT r
OCERTIFIED OcoD 0 EXPRESS 0 POSTAGE 
Tr
co MAIL DUE OPARCEL OHOLD .
o inte-ruaonai mail subje.t to StOrage sfu., alter (Dlte) -
0 SPECIAL For seera At.cle FPLACED UNDER YOUR DOOR ] RESTRICTEDDELIVER deliveries: OPLACE IN YOUR LETER BOX DELIVERY
C3If not picked up at Post Office before carrier begins his next ZIP OF ORIGIN
regular trip he will deliver it to you.
CUSTOMER fP-deorr5ary ADN ~t
CLAIM CHECK
ADDRESSEE NAME (Print) C
ADDRESS
2
DELIVERED BY AND DATE RECEIVED BY L






















RULE 4: SERVICE BY MAIL
Appendix B
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF SUPREME COURT'S PROPOSALS
*Plaintiff may serve by any manner prescribed by any statute of the U.S. or in
the manner prescribed by state law except that mail service may ONLY be
made in the following manner:
or registered mail, return receipt requested and delivery restricted
taddressee
If sender receives a
signed receipt, it is
prima facie evidence
of service of process.








receipt nor the re-
turned envelope
marked "refused,"
and the person so
served fails to appear





evidence of service of
process,) however,
* Service shall not be the basis for the entry of a default or a default judgment
unless the record contains a returned receipt showing acceptance or a returned
envelope showing refusal of process. Any such default or judgment by default
shall be set aside if the defendant demonstrates to the court that the returned
receipt was signed or delivery was refused by unauthorized person.
For the purposes of provision 4 (j), if service is made by mail, service shall be
deemed to have been obtained as of the date on which the process was ac-
cepted, refused, or returned as unclaimed. The proposal contained a 30-day
time limit in which to effect service.
sender shall mail to defendant by
first-class mail a copy of summons
and complaint and a notice that
despite such refusal the case will
proceed and that judgment by
default will be rendered against him
unless he appears to defend the suit.
sender shall make supplemental ser-
vice, OTHER than by mail, by:
(d)(1) delivering a copy to him per-
sonally or by leaving copies at his
dwelling house or usual place of
abode with some person of suitable
age and discretion residing therein
OR by delivering a copy to an agent
authorized by law to receive service
(d)(3) delivering a copy to an of-
ficer, a managing or general agent,
or to any other agent authorized by
appointment or by law to receive
service.
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Appendix C
FINAL DRAFT OF SUPREME COURT'S PROPOSAL
*Plaintiff may serve process by any manner prescribed by any statute of the
U.S. or state law except that mail service may ONLY be made in the following
manner:
Certified or registered mail return receipt requested and delivery restricted
to addressee
If sender receives a
signed receipt, defend-
ant is served.
If sender receives the
returned envelope
marked "refused,"








* Service shall not be the basis for the entry of a default or a judgment by
default unless the record contains a returned receipt showing acceptance by the
defendant or a returned envelope showing refusal of the process by the defen-
dant. Any such default or judgment by default shall be set aside pursuant to
Rule 55(c) or Rule 60(b) if the defendant demonstrates to the court that the
returned receipt was signed or delivery was refused by an unauthorized person.
For the purpose of provision 4(), if service is made by mail, service shall
be deemed to have been made as of the date on which the process was accepted,
refused, or returned as unclaimed.
sender shall mail to defendant by
first-class mail a copy of the sum-
mons and complaint and a notice
that despite such refusal the case
will proceed and that judgment by
default will be rendered against him
unless he appears to defend the suit.
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Appendix D
RULE 4 AS AMENDED (CONGRESS) 1983
*Plaintiff may follow state law procedures of any kind authorized, OR follow
federal procedures by:
Service by first-class mail postage prepaid, including 2 copies of a notice
and acknowledgement form and a stamped, self-addressed envelope
* If service is not made within 120 days of filing a complaint, and plaintiff
cannot show good cause why service was not made, the action shall be dis-
missed without prejudice upon a court's own initiative or upon motion.
If defendant executes and returns to
sender one copy of the notice and
acknowledgement form within 20
days of sender's mailing, service is
complete.
If defendant does not execute and
return to sender one copy of the.
notice and acknowledgement form
within 20 days of sender's date of
mailing
service shall be made by personal
service.
(Note: Defendant may be required
to pay the costs of personal service
unless he can show good cause for
failure to return the notice of
acknowledgement form.)
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